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Fwd: [Cryptography] "DarkHotel" APT routinely breaking RSA512
- To: grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com>
- Subject: Fwd: [Cryptography] "DarkHotel" APT routinely breaking RSA512
- From: guninski@guninski.com (Georgi Guninski)
- Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 19:38:50 +0200
- Cc: cypherpunks@cpunks.org
- In-reply-to: <CAD2Ti29AYaH3UtTOn=1mfVnUuyHz7+azgcBcAXZT6koO19JMQw@mail.gmail.com>
- References: <E1Xnxnf-0003yi-VM@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net> <CAD2Ti29AYaH3UtTOn=1mfVnUuyHz7+azgcBcAXZT6koO19JMQw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Nov 10, 2014 at 09:17:00PM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Henry Baker <hbaker1@pipeline.com>
> Date: Mon, Nov 10, 2014 at 5:50 PM
> Subject: [Cryptography] "DarkHotel" APT routinely breaking RSA512
> To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
>
>
> "The Darkhotel crewâ??s skillset allows it to launch interesting
> cryptographical attacks, for instance factoring 512 bit RSA keys"
>
Factoring RSA 512 is well within earthy resources as of now.
Probably modest botnet (for sieving) + good machines for linear
algebra will factor RSA 512 in moderate time.
The interesting question is: did they some crypto breakthrough?
btw, RSA cancelled their monetary challenges even for >512...
> The keys are used to create bogus certificates, e.g.,
>
> GTE
> CyberTrust
> Digisign Server iD
> (Enrich)
> flexicorp.jaring.my sha1/
> RSA (512 bits)
> Expired 12/17/2008 12/17/2010
>
> Equifax
> Secure
> eBusiness
> CA 1
> Equifax Secure
> eBusiness CA 1
> secure.hotelreykjavik.i s
> md5/RSA (512 bits)
> invalid Sig 2/27/2005 3/30/2007
>
> http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=17612
>
> http://25zbkz3k00wn2tp5092n6di7b5k.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf
>
>
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