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open ASIC SoC
- To: coderman <[email protected]>, Bryan Bishop <[email protected]>
- Subject: open ASIC SoC
- From: [email protected] (Cathal (Phone))
- Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2014 09:21:12 +0000
- Cc: cpunks <[email protected]>
- In-reply-to: <CAJVRA1SC8NkdV7nRpTJmhjodVsyiUzDf88PHNWgXz3pkwU=LMA@mail.gmail.com>
- References: <CAJVRA1QPDFTLzy19XZD_2wiS=8x6k9aodncTkBJKQMgy0ijciw@mail.gmail.com> <CABaSBawxQ6etwL9AB=UG_njRb=UX6TsJzWHHK-NWC=JwprpBDQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAJVRA1SC8NkdV7nRpTJmhjodVsyiUzDf88PHNWgXz3pkwU=LMA@mail.gmail.com>
Given the difficulty of trusting auditors and ensuring they see all they need to see, why not push instead for crypto FPGA: consuner hardware, widely available. Probably hard to dope-trojan without breaking, and cleverly random allocation of transistors to the HWPRNG could mitigate.
An open fpga with an open stack would not only be more trustworthy for crypto, I think it'd help legitimise and pave way for small-batch ASIC, too.
On 5 November 2014 08:41:54 GMT+00:00, coderman <[email protected]> wrote:
>On 11/4/14, Bryan Bishop <[email protected]> wrote:
>> ...
>> Are there any open-source ASICs for wifi, bluetooth, gsm, cdma, or
>> other communication chips?
>
>build in array of direct quadrature modulator circuits (RFIC) in the
>desired bands for software stacks across all of the above. that gets
>you performance and efficiency, all in one! (or many, as it were)
>
>there are open source SDR stacks for some of the above, however,
>traditional SDR as crudely shoved into a SoC would not work so well.
>this is a longer discussion, of course :)
>
>
>
>> I would appreciate any references or links you can provide me to
>> working chains of custody and their threat models. I am curious to
>see
>> what a good one looks like.
>
>a trusted set of auditors is on premise able to observe the wafer
>processing, litho, etc. to die prep and packing, with device testing
>results for each core attached.
>
>packages collected till end of run, then trusted auditors depart with
>the set of presumably trusted fabrication parts.
>
>
>
>> I think that chain of custody is going to
>> be problematic because of dopant-level trojans,...
>
>the selective FIB deconstruction to verify, along with constructions
>resistant to stealthy dopant tampering, could leave you more confident
>that the set of chips so run were not surreptitiously tampered with.
>
>obviously, if chain of custody ever broken, the chips become suspect.
>
>
>
>this is all an amusing thought exercise, given the complete lack of
>anything remotely as hard to run software wise on top of this
>idealistic open soc :)
>
>
>best regards,
--
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
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